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& LOAN, a Utah corporation,
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ESKELSON, LARSON PAINTING COMPANY, and UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendants and Respondents.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BEEHIVE SECURITY THRIFT \
& LOAN, a Utah corporation,
\
Plaintiff and Appellant)
vs.

JOHN T. HYDE and ~I1-\.RY C. \
HYDE, his wife, KERMIT R. (
ESI(ELSON, L ...t\.RSON PAINTING c,OMPANY, and UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendants and Respondents. i

No.
10232

1
)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMEN'f OF 'l"'HE 1\:IND

01~

CASE

This is an action by plaintiff to declare a promissory
note in default and foreclose a mortgage. Defendants,
Kermit R. Eskelson and John 'f. Hyde, counterclaimed
asserting the loan was usurious.
3
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
At pretrial,~ the Honorable A. H. Ellett ruled as
a matter of law that the pro1nissory note in favor of
appellant, Beehive Security 'l'hrift & Loan, violated the
usury laws of the State of Utah and, that the mortgage
note and mortgage are in default and entitled to be
closed.

RELIEF SOUGH'T ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the Order granting
respondents' counterclaim that the note is usurious.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant, Beehive Security Thrift and Loan, a
Utah corporation, is a licensed industrial loan corporation. On or about April 18, 1961, John T. Hyde
and Kermit R. Eskelson executed and delivered to
Beehive Security Company, now known as Beehive
Security Thirft and Loan, a mortgage note, and J olu1
T. Hyde and Mary C. Hyde executed and delivered
a real estate mortgage to secure the payment of said
mortgage note. The note was in the principal amount
of $7,128.00, representing cash loaned of $5,000.00,
life insurance of $484.71, recording fees of $20.00 and
a setting up charge of $1,603.29.
This action was commenced by Beehive Security
Thrift and Loan to foreclose on its note and mortgage
executed by Eskelson and the Hydes.

4
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Payments totaling $694.00 were made: by John
'f. Hyde, after which he defaulted on the loan.
The Honorable A. H. Ellett, at pretrial, ruled
as a matter of law that the loan was usurious; and,
that interest may not be charged by an industrial loan
company on a loan in excess of $5,000.00. The trial
court determined that of the total sum paid, $539.24·
should be credited as principal, and the balance to
interest, resulting in a tripled amount of $464.28.
Attorney fees were assessed against appellant in the
sum of $141.00, resultir1g in a net set-off of $1,144.52,
and judgment of $3,855.48.

ARGUMENT

POINT 1. AN INDUSTRIAL LOAN COMpANY CAN CHARGE INTEREST ON A LOAN
IN EXCESS OF $5,000.00.
Interest charges for industrial loan corporations
are regulated by Section 15-1-2 and Chapter 8, Title
7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provide as follows:
Section 15-1-2:
"The parties to any contract may agree in
writing for the payment of interest for the loan
or forbearance of any money, goods or things in
action, not to exceed ten percent per annum~
provided:
5
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"(f) 'That industrial loan corporations may
contract for and receive interest and charges at
the rates subject to the limitations contained in
Chapter 8, Title 7, Utah Code Annotated 1953;"

Section 7-8-3 :
''Every industrial loan corporation shall have
power:

*

*

*

*

"(b) To charge interest for the full term of the
loan computed on the original amount of the loan
(excluding charges) at the rate of 1% or less
per month on that part of the loan note in excess
of $2,000.00 and at the rate of 3;4 of 1% per
month or' less on that part of the loan in excess
of $2,000.00, but not in excess of $5,000.00, without regard to any requirement for installment
payments, (subject to the refund for prepayment
in full as set forth in paragraph d) ."
The issue presented by this appeal is a question
of fir~t impression with this Court. Moreover, the
issue has never been decided by any court.
As a basic premise, it would seem that there is
no question but what an industrial loan corporation
may loan in excess of $5,000.00 to any one person.
The only restriction as to the a1nount of loans to any
one person is contained in Section 7-8-5, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, which provides as follows:
"No such corporation shall:

*

*

*

*

'~ (2}. Hold at any one time the obligation or

obligations of any one person aggregating more

6
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than five precent of the amount of its paid up
capital and surplus."
Since the Utah Code permits an industrial
company to lend in excess of $5,000.00 to any
person ,the issue is squarely, Can the industrial
corporation collect interest on that portion of the
in excess of $5,000.00?

loan
one
loa11
loan

The code provision, Section 15-1-2, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, sets the maximum interest rate which
may be charged by lenders generally, and in addition
permits a greater rate to be charged by industrial
loan corporations. Section 7-8-3, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, permits the industrial loan corporation higher
rates up to $5"000.00, but in no way purports to deny
interest to lenders who loan in excess of $5,000.00 to
any one person.
This question has been presented to the Attorney
General of the State of Utah, and an opinoin was
expressed by his office to the effect that a loan could
be made in excess of $5,000.00 and interest at the maximum legal rate as provided in Section 15-1-2, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, could be charged on the amount
in excess of $5,000.00. 'rhe applicable portion of the
opinion is as follows:
"We are of the opinion that the foregoing·
statute does not establish a Hutxitnum loan which
may be made by an industrial loan corporation .
but rather fixes the maximurn rate of interest
which may be charged on loans not in excess of

7
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$5,000.00 and parts thereof. Section 15-1-2,
U.C.A. 1953, as amended, provides in part:
"The parties to any contract may agree in
writing for the payment of interest for the loan
or for forbearance of any money, goods or
things in action, not to exceed ten per cent per
annum; _provided:

*
*
(f) That industrial loan corporations may
contract for and receive interest and charges
at the rates subject to the limitations contained
in Chapter 8, Title 7, Utah Code Annotated
1953. * * * " (Emphasis added.)

*

*

"It follows from the foregoing statute that
any party, including an industrial loan corporation, may charge the legal rate of interest
provided in Section 15-1-2, supra, on any loan
without regard as to amount. We conclude that
an industrial loan corporation may charge the
interest rate permitted in Section 7-8-3, supra,
for loans not in excess of $5,000.00, and the legal
rate of interest authorized under Section 15-1-2
for that part of a loan in excess thereof.
"Persuasive in reaching this conclusion is the
legislative treatment of small loan corporations
and the limitations imposed thereon as to the
amount of the loans and interest charged. Section 7-10-lB(a), U.C.A. 1953, as a1nended, provides as follows :
' (a) Every licensee qualified under this act
may contract for and receive, on any loan of
money not exceeding $600.00 in amount,
charges at a rate not exceeding 3% per month
on that part of the unpaid principal balance
8
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not in excess of $300.00 and at a rate: of 1%
per month on that part of the unpaid principal
balance in excess of $300.00 but not in excess
of $600.00 * * * '
"Section 7-10-15, U.C.A. 1953, as amended,
provides in part :
'If any licensee shall loan or contract for
the loan of an a1nount in excess of $600.00 to
any one borrower, whether as a part of one
transaction or as the aggregate of more than
one transaction, he shall not be permitted to
charge, contract for, or receive, either directly
or indirectly, upon any such loan or aggregate
of such loans, or upon any part thereof, interest in excess of that which he would be permitted by la'v to charge if he were not licensed
hereunder. * * * '
"In view of the foregoing authority, we reaso11
that had the Legislature intended to limit industrial corporations to a maximum loan an1ount, or
had the Legislature intended that for loans in
excess of $5,000.00 the industrial loan corporation could not take advantage of the greater
rate permitted under Section 7-8-3, express provision would have been made therefor. Under
the Small Loan Act the Legislature did not restrict the small loan corporation from making
loans in excess of a specific amount, but rather
expressly provided for a lower interest rate on
the entire loan in the event the loan exceeded a
$600.00 maximum.
"Since the legislature did not so expressly
provide in the case of an industrial loan corporation, we hesitate to apply any generous interpretations to that effect and would, therefore,
9

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

conclude that in the event an industrial loan corporation makes a loan in excess of $5,000.00, it
may charge the rate of interest provided in Section 7-8-3, supra, on the amounts not in excess
of $5,000.00, and on that part of the loan in excess
of $5,000.00, the industrial loan corporation may
charge that rate of interest which would be permitted by law if it were not licensed as an industrial loan corporation.
"Of course, the amount of any loan is limited
by Section 7-8-5 ( 2) , which prohibits any industrial loan corporation from holding at any one
time an obligation or obligations of any one
person aggregating more than five percent of
the amount of its paid up capital and surplus."
This court, in discussing statutory construction and
the manner in which usury statutes should be interpreted, said in Cobb v. Hartenstein~ 47 Utah 147, 152

P. 424:
"Since usury laws are quasi-penal, the courts
will not hold a contract to be in violation of the
usury laws, unless upon a fair a11d reasonable
construction of all its terms, in view of the dealings of the parties, it is manifest that the intent
of the parties was to engage in such a transaction
as is forbidden by those laws. If two reasonable
constructions are possible, by one of which the
contract will be legal and valid, while by the
other it will be usurious and invalid, the court
will always adopt the for1ner. In sho1·t, the general rule of interpretation and construction of
contracts may be said to be that the contract is
not usurious when it may be explained on a11y
other hypothesis."

10
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POINT 2. THE LENDER CAN ALLO'l~
PAYMEN'fS TO PRINCIPAL AND THERE
IS NO INTERES'l, PAID WHICH CAN BE
TREBLED.
Section 15-1-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which
permits the recovery of interest paid is as follows:

'' * * * In case the greater rate of interest has
been paid the person by whom it has been paid
or his legal representative, Inay recover back
three times the an1ount of the interest thus paid
from the receiver or taker thereof and reasonable
attorneys fees, * * * ''
From a careful reading of the statute, it is evident
that usurious interest must be paid by the borrower
before any penalty can be recovered.
In the case of McBroom v. Scottish Mortgage and
Land Investment Company~ 153 U.S. 318, 38 L. Ed.
729, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep., 852, the Supreme Court was
called upon to interpret a New Mexico statute which
provided that the collection of interest at a higher
rate than 12% was a misdemeanor and which permitted
the collection and recovery of double the amount so
collected or received upon any action brought for the
recovery of the same. After the first payment was made,
the borrower brought his suit to recover under the
statute. In discussing the statute, the court said:
"By the statute of N e"' Mexico it is provided
that 'In written contracts for the payment of
money it shall not be legal to recover more tha.n
12% interest per annum;' that 'any person, per-

11
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sons or corporation who shall hereafter charge,
collect or receive from any person a higher rate
of interest than 12 per cent per annum shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor * * *; and such person,
persons, or corporations shall forfeit to the perso"n of whom such interest was collected or received, or his executors, administrators, or assigns, double the amount so collected or received
upon any action brought for the recovery of
the same * * *.' Our conclusion upon this branch
of the case is that, upon principal and authority,
the contract of loan, in question, providing for
usurious interest cannot be held void except as
to the interest in excess of what the statute allowed to be charged, collected or received.
"The contract of loan not being void, except
as to the excess of interest stipulated to be paid,
the question arises whether the lender is liable to
an action for the penalty prescribed by the
statute so long as the principal debt, with legal
interest thereon, after deducing all payments,
is unpaid. We are of the opinion that this question must be answered in the negative. \Vhile,
under the statute, the n1ere charging of usurious
interest may be a misdemeanor for which the
lender can be fined, whether such usurious interest is or is not collected or received, the borrower has no cause of action until usurious interest has been actua~ly collected or received from
him. Such is the Inandate of the statute. And
interest cannot be said to have been collected
or received, in excess of what may be lawfully
collected and received, until the lender has, in
fact-after giving credit for all payinents--collected or received more than the sum loaned
'
with legal interest."

12
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It is submitted that no interest has been paid by
respondents because the entire principal of the loan
has not been repaid.

POINT 3. THE TIME IN WHICH THE
AC'fiON FOR RECO-VERY OF USURIOUS
INTEREST HAS LAPSED CAUSING RESPONDEN'l,'S COUN'l.,ERCLAIM '1.,0 BE
BARRED.
Section 15-1-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which
permits the recovery of interest paid provides as follo,vs:

" * * * In case the greater rate of interest has
been paid the person by 'vhom it has been paid,
or his legal representatives, may recover back
three times the amount of the interest thus paid
from the receiver or taker therereof and reasonable attorney fees, provided that such action is
commenced within two years from the time the
usurious transactio,n occurred:'-' (Emphasis added.)
In the event the Court finds that the note is usurious
and that interest has been paid, it is asserted that statutory period in which the action may be brought had
expired. The original transaction between appellant
and respondent occurred on Aprill8, 1961. Respondent
Kermit R. Eskelson, filed an answer asserting usury
on February 21, 1963; however, he is not entitled to
this defense because it must be asserted by one who has
paid the interest or his legal representative. The answer
filed by the Hydes was not filed until January 21, 1964,
13
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at which time the statutory two-year period had expired.
The time period set out in the statute should be strictly
construed, because the cause of action is created by
statute. Treating with this matter is a statement from
34 Am. Jur.~ Limitation of Actions~ §7:
"A statute of limitations should be differentiated from conditions which are annexed to a
right of action created by statute. A statute which
in itself creates a new liability, gives an action
to enforce it unknown to the common law, and
fixes the time within which that action may be
commenced, is not a statute of limitations. It
is a statute of creation, and the commencement
of the action within the time it fixes is an indispensable condition of the liability and .of the
action which it permits. The time element is an
inherent element of the right so created, and the
limitation of the remedy is a limitation of the
right. Such a provision will control, no matter
in what form the action is brought. The statute
is an offer of an action on condition that it be
commenced within the specified time. If the offer
is not accepted in the only way in which it can
be accepted, by a commencement of the action
within the specified time, the action and the right
of action no longer exist, and the defendant is
exempt from liability."

relativ

1

effecti

It
erred i
·

~rab£

~rtioi

~de
daiml

If the Court finds that an allocation can be made
between principal and interest, then it necessarily ,Yould
follow that the time in which "such action is comme11ced"
must commence on the date the transaction is entered
into and expire two years hence. Accordingly, assuming
arguendo only, the correctness of the trial court's rulina
0
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relative to the issue of usury, the respondents Hyde
effectively are barred from asserting their counterclain1.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court
erred in ruling that appellant, an industrial loan corporation, is barred from charging interest upon the
portion of a loan exceeding $5,000.00, and that respondents Hyde were not barred from asserting the
claim of usury.
Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM G. FOWLER, ESQ.
Attorney for Appellant
340 East Fourth South Street

Salt Lake City, Utah
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